The validation of data from sensors has be come an important issue in the operation and control of modern industrial plants. One ap proach is to use know ledge based techniques to detect inconsistencies in measured data.
INTRODUCTION
Computing is playing an increasingly important role in domains like communications, medicine, and industry.
Examples of industrial applications include the control of advanced manufacturing plants, power generation, power distribution, and chemical processes. These ap plications require the utilization of several method ologies that have emerged from the area of artificial intelligence (AI). In general, AI methods are moving towards more realistic domains that require coopera tion between several fields of research. This paper de scribes an ongoing research project in the utilization of AI methods to solve the problem of sensor valida tion. Although the techniques presented here can be considered as general, the specific application is in the power plants domain.
The approach proposed in this paper has two layers:
• a prediction layer: which is used to predict the ex pected values of the sensors and identify potential faults;
• a constraint satisfaction layer: which is used to distinguish the faulty sensor(s) from the appar ently faulty ones.
Both layers make use of a probabilistic network model.
A probabilistic or Bayesian network [Pearl, 1988] is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose structure corre sponds to the dependency relations of the set of vari ables represented in the network (nodes), and which is parameterized by the conditional probabilities (links) required to specify the underlying distribution. In this case, the nodes correspond to the sensors that consti tute the model. The structure of the network makes explicit the dependence and independence relations between the variables.
In this approach, with the use of probability propaga tion, a prediction is made of a variable's value based on other parameters. If this predicated value devi ates from the actual value given by a sensor, by some predefined margin, then some fault can be assumed.
But the fault detection mechanism can only tell if a sensor has a potential fault, but it can not tell if the fault is real or apparent. The central problem is to de velop a theory, and then an algorithm, for distinguish ing real and apparent faults, considering that one or more sensors can fail at the same time. For this, the structure of the model is considered, which produces a set of constraints that has to be solved to determine the faulty sensor( s). This article then, presents an ap proach based in two levels: (i) probability propagation, to detect a potential fault, and (ii) constraint manage ment, to distinguish the real faulty from the apparent ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in troduces the problem and summarizes previous ap proaches. Section :3 presents the approach with the aid of a simple example. Section 4 presents the ideas formally. Section 5 describes a real example that shows the complete technique. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions and future work.
SENSOR VALIDATION
The validation of data from sensors has become an imp ortant issue in the operation and control of modern industrial plants. Usually, the control system can not detect significant deviations from the expected values given the design working point, for example of the gas turbine in a power plant. • Analytical redundancy: in which all process, actu ators and sensors are monitored centrally. Exam ples of these techniques are generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) [Willsky and Jones, 1976] , and failure sensitwe filters [Massoumnia, 1986] .
However , these approaches can require the develop ment of mathematical or knowledge based models whose solution require expensive computer power. Ad d itionally, they are very expensive and demand an enormous amount of expertise to use them in a differ ent process or even make a modificati on of the mon itored system. Modern techniques, from where this project is motivated , include a decentralised and hier archical approach [Yung and Clarke, 1989] . A survey of some of these techniques can be found in [Basseville, 1988] .
Previous stages in the development of this proj ect in cluded some experiments in the validation of signals in power plants [Ibargiiengoytia et al., 1995] . These experiments were based on the following assumption:
each sensor is validated independently, i.e., each vari able was considered as the hypothesis while some other variables were considered as correct evidence. How ever , a real solution of the problem requires a different set of assumptions to be taken. For example, if the turbine velocity is validated u tilizing only the signals of temperature and pressure, and if the re as oning re-ports a faulty sensor, it is impossible to define which sensor was the faulty one. In this example, if the tern perature sensor fails and it is utilized to detect a fault in the velocity, the system will certainly report a fail ure on the velocity reading. This could be a wrong conclusion.
Such an approach , of course , requires the help of do main experts to identify the dependencies of the vari ables and must also take into account of the following characteristics:
• The sensors can provide erroneous informa tion.
• Information is available all the time, i .e., all sen sors can be observed as evidence or considered as an hypothesis at any time .
• The system must respond within a real time en vironment.
• The application considers the possibility of mul tiple faults.
THE APPROACH PROPOSED
This section presents the approach proposed through a very simple example. Assume the model of the gas turbine in a power plant shown in 
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The use of a constraint satisfaction system is required .
In this case, the presence of a faulty sensor causes a constrained area of rnaniff:'st.ation which forms a con text. The contexts can be arranged in a lattice as shown in Fig. : ) . The lower nod!:' represents the no fault contf:'xt of t.he systern . The upp!:'r layers repre Sf:'nt an incremental assumption of faulty sensors. The top node represents a context. where all the Sf:'nsors are reported faulty. Figure : 3: Lattice with the four variab les, m, t, p, and g, for the model in Fig. 1 .
Every step in the probabilist.ic rf:'asoning generates a constraint. for the final detection of the sensor in fail. S tarting at the bottom of the lattice of Fig. 3 , eac-h step will rnake a transition between thf:' nodes of the lattice. Figure 4 shows the transitions from thP bottom node (cp) to thf:' final node : {m,l,y}. That is, a directed ar.ydic graph (; which is a mmimal !-map of tlw dt>pend<·ncy nw del M for a probability
wherf' I(X,Z, Y), X, y·,z art' subsets of V, denot.es conditional independt>nce of X and Y given Z, and is a minnnal!-m!lJI of P.
A Mnrkuv blrwktl. for a.uy node X in a B ayesian net work is it suh:-;t>t of V which rnakes it. i n dependen t frorn tilE' ut.lwr variahlt>s.
In a Bayesian network, the Markov blanket of a node X can be formed by the union of its direct parents P A(X), its direct successors .')U(X), and all direct parents of the latter S'P(X) (X's spouses). Lemma 1 (symmetry): Let. X bt-> a node in a
Bayesian network G with a Markov blanket.:J M H(X),
the Markov blanket of all the variables that are in M B(X), and it is only in these Markov blankets. Proof: From assurnption 2, an error in X produces a potential fault in X. From Lemma 1, X is an el ement of the MB of all sensors Y; E M B(X), so by assumption :3, an error in X produces potential faults in all sensors in M B(X). Finally, from Lemma 1 X is not an elernent of any other MB, so no other potential fault will be detected (assuming X is the only sensor in fault.). O · Corollary 1: Ass u m ing a single (only one se nsor fails} real fault. a potwtwl fault in all the sensors in 8 C (; implies a real fault in a sensor X such that EM B(X) = S, and X E .)'.
Given that an error in a sensor produees a potential fault. in all the sensors in its EMB and only in those, a potential fault in all sensors in .'J' implies that a sensor in fault has its EM B =,)'(assuming one real fault). The validity of Corollary 2 follows from Corollary l and the fa('t that all MB are different.
The problem is that two or more variables could have the sarn e Markov blanket. Such is the case of leaf nodes with the same parent in a tree.
Corollary 3: If there is an error in sensor X with EM B(X), and also an error in Y with EM B(Y), they will produce potential fault.s in all nodes Z E EM B(X) U Eivf B(Y). ln general, if there are errors in sensors X;, i = 1, ... , m, they will produce potential faults in all nodes Z E Elvf B(X!} U .. U EM B(Xm) Corollary ;) follows clire('tly frorn Theorem l. assurning that two or rnore Pnors will not cancel e aeh other (i.e., if Z E M B(X) and Z E M B(Y) and both , X and Y fail , still a potential fault. will be detected in Z). (e) If none of the above cases is satisfied, then there are multiple faults but they can not be distinguished. All the sensors whose EMB are subsets of S could have a real fault.
Notice that the propagation on t he lattice is an index ing of a, table, i.e., no e<tl c.ulations art' rE>quired . This is a very important feature for a system running in real tirne.
The next. section explains the algorithm proposed in a real example, taken from a t. h�rmoelectrical power plant .
SENSOR VA LIDATION IN A POWER PLANT
In ord er to dernonstrate the ideas contained in t his article, a rnodule of a combined cy cle power plant was chosen: the gas turbine. F igure 5 shows a simplified schern ati c dia.grarn of the type of gas turbines at the Dos Bo('as and Gomu Palacio power plants in Mexico.
., R A g<ts turbine consists fu ndamentally of fo ur main parts: t he com pressor , t h e combustion cham ber, the turbin<" itself and tlw generat or. The corn p ressor feeds air to t he combustion chamber , wheff� the g as is also
fed .
Here, the cornhustion produces h igh pressure gases at high ternJwratun'_ The expansion of t h ese ga�es in tllP t urbin P producPs t llP turbine rotation w ith � t.orq ue that is transrni ttf'd to the generator in order to produce the dert.rir power output. The air is rf'g ulat.ed by means of the mlet guzde vanes (I<�V) of the compressor , an d a co nt ro l valve d ocs t he same for the ga.'> fuel in tlw combustion charnber. The control valve is cotnrnanded by the control system or by the oper ator in t h e rn anua.l operation mode, and its apert ure ran be read by a p osi t ion sensor. The temperature at the blade p at h . which is the rnost cri ti c al variable. is taken along tlw c ircumference of the turbine.
Among all vari ab le:s that participate in the gas tur bine, only a few are directly 1neasured by the sensors. Since the blade path temperature is the most critical variable. it is obtain<'cl t h ro u gh sixteen thermocouple sensors locat.Pcl all around the t.ur b iw' . From t hese sixteen, three �ets of averages arc taken by analog cir cuitry. These val ues are then averaged in order to obtain a single value for the temperature. T he op� erator is informed of the average temperature, which is also used by a control st rategy to protect the en gine. Table : 3 , it is easy to see that th e lat- i s {fl,pr, dp} , and the da node is {pa, da}. Conse quently, the lattice no de of the com b ined fai lure of pr and da is the union of their corresponding lattice nodes, i.e., {f l, pr, pa, dp, da}. Finally, if there exists a fa ult in sensor dp and sensor p1· , the resulting unio n between both ('X t(' n ded Markov b lanketo> io> given by {f1 , dp, The m aiu lilllitatiuu uf the proposed al goritluu is that in so mP ca:><-'S . it i::< nut p ossi b le to id('ntify prel' isPiy tht· real fault ;u uung all the se nw r:> with pot('ntial fau lts. Tht:> cases wlwn no <-'X<-txt answer is p rovi de d ar<-' suru m ari z e cl as fo llows:
• two or 11101'<-' sP nsors with the same EM B,
• a don hie fa ult IV lwr<-' onp EM B is a subset of t.lw otlwr.
• mtdtipiP f<lul ts in which somP of t lw EM B fa.l l m tlw p re vio us cases.
For exam ple, in Fig. 6 , vari ablPs t 1. t'2, and t:3 fall Pll the firs t. ca�<-'-In Fig. I Thanks abo t.o the anonymous n>ferees for t hei r corn ll l<-'llt.s which im p roved this artie!<-'
